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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
school children will be nullified as either "ingenious" or "ingenuous"
attempts to evade the Constitution, a document which, as has been said,
is "colorblind."4 6
ROBERT G. WEBB
Constitutional Law-Military Jurisdiction Over Civilians
In the last two decades the United States has been confronted with a
major world war and a police action in Korea. These have necessitated
wholesale conscription of millions of American citizens to supply the
armies needed, and the additional use of citizens in civilian capacities to
complement these armies. In such situations the military requires
prompt and efficient means of dealing with personnel who commit acts
threatening the discipline and morale of the armed forces. Resort was
made to the age-old military tribunal, the court-martial.' Thus during
war time courts-martial have long exercised jurisdiction over uniformed
military personnel and civilians accompanying the armed forces in the
field.2
However, upon cessation of hostilities, there arises the question of
continued military jurisdiction over persons who committed crimes while
on active duty but were separated prior to being charged with such
crimes. The general rule was that a discharge or separation divested the
military of jurisdiction.3 In United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke,4
the Supreme Court held this rule applicable to one who was discharged
and immediately re-enlisted, reasoning that courts-martial could not
assume jurisdiction without a grant of congressional authority.
This case motivated Congress,5 in enacting the new Uniform Code
of Military Justice6 (hereafter referred to as UCMJ), to include article
3(a),7 a provision retaining military jurisdiction over serious offenders
'" Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
'For a concise historical development of courts-martial, see WINTHROP,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 45-51 (2d ed. reprint 1920).
'See, e.g., Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376 (1920); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S.(20 How.) 65 (1858) ; Perlstein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1945) ;
Ex parte Campo, 71 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub. nom. United States
ex rel. Campo v. Swenson, 165 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1947) ; In re Berue, 54 F. Supp.
252 (S.D. Ohio 1944) ; McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943).
'MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 14 (1951); MANUAL FOR
CoURTs-MARTim, U.S. ARmy, 9 (1949).
'336 U.S. 210 (1949).
' H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 11 (1949) ; S. REP. No. 486, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
610 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (Supp. V, 1958).
7 "[N]o person charged with having committed, while in a status in which
he was subject to this chapter, an offense against this chapter, punishable by confine-
ment for five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried in the courts
of the United States ... may be relieved from amenability to trial by court-martial
by reason of the termination of that status." 10 U.S.C. § 803 (a) (Supp. V, 1958).
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who had been lost to courts-martial by reason of a termination of their
code status. Of equal constitutional significance is article 2(11), s which
grants military jurisdiction over all "persons serving with, employed by,
or accompanying the armed forces" without the continental limits of the
United States. These two jurisdictional provisions and their application
to persons not in uniform are the subject of this Note.
The constitutionality of article 3 (a) was squarely presented in United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,9 where it was held that petitioner, a dis-
charged ex-serviceman who had severed all connections with the military,
could not constitutionally be tried by court-martial for offenses against
UCMJ committed while on active duty overseas. The Court emphasized
that the necessity for compelling obedience and order in the military
authorized Congress, under its power to make rules for the regulation
of the land and naval forces,10 to establish courts-martial. However, the
Constitution did not authorize Congress to expand court-martial jurisdic-
tion to include civilians whose relationship with the military had been
severed by discharge. The amenability of such civilians to military
tribunals had no proper relationship to continued maintenance of order
and discipline of the services, hence they could not be deprived of the
right to a trial by jury in a civil court.
When the constitutionality of article 2(11) was presented in 1956
the Supreme Court held," relying on the principle that constitutional
guarantees do not extend beyond the boundaries of the United States,'2
that Congress could constitutionally subject civilian wives, accompany-
ing their servicemen-husbands overseas, to trial by court-martial for the
murder of their husbands. On rehearing the following year the Court
in Reid v. Covert's reversed itself and held that the Constitution neces-
sarily follows the flag since all authority for governmental action abroad
is derived from the Constitution. Thus, American citizens accompanying
the military overseas were entitled to the safeguards of the Bill of
Rights.14 Four justices thought that the power to make regulations for
the land and naval forces did not encompass persons who could not
fairly be said to be in the military service, although they recognized
that there might be circumstances where a person could be in the armed
services even though he had not formally been inducted into the military.
They concluded that dependents of servicemen were not in the military
for purposes of trial by court-martial, stating that "a statute cannot be
810 U.S.C. § 802(11) (Supp. V, 1958).
9 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
loU.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
" Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487(1956), 35 N.C.L. REv. 157.12 Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) ; In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
12354 U.S. 1 (1957).
" U.S. CONsT. amend. I-IX.
1959]
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framed by which a civilian can lawfully be mnade amenable to the nilitary
jurisdiction in time of peace."'5  The two concurring Justices', limited
their holding to capital cases involving dependents in peace time.
In United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy,"' the Covert holding
was held inapplicable to a civilian employee of the Air Force convicted
and sentenced by court-martial under the authority of article 2(11) for
conspiracy' s to commit larceny.19 Noting that federal courts prior to
UCMJ had also sustained military jurisdiction in similar cases, 20 the
court reasoned that civilian employees may be deemed part of the military
since certain civilians are indispensable to its operations. Following this
reasoning a later district court decision 2 ' held a civilian employed by the
military in France amenable to court-martial for premeditated murder.22
In the recent case of Wheeler v. Reynolds,23 involving article 3(a),
a district court held an inactive reservist amenable to court-martial
jurisdiction for a murder he allegedly committed while on active duty
in Germany. Distinguishing the Toth case, the court found an assign-
ment to the inactive reserve did not operate as a discharge so as to de-
prive the military of jurisdiction. However, prior to UCMJ it was
held 24 that an assignment to the inactive reserve was the equivalent of
a discharge, and the court refused to allow the reservists to be recalled
to active duty for the sole purpose of trial by court-martial. That the
discharge should no longer be the determinative factor since the passage
of UCMJ is shown by a case,25 involving a fact situation essentially the
same as Hirshberg, where the Military Court of Appeals held that a
discharge did not divest courts-martial of jurisdiction for offenses com-
mitted during a former enlistment when the accused immediately re-
enlisted. Morale, discipline, and good order required punishment for
offenders still serving in the armed forces.
From the foregoing it appears that a discharged ex-serviceman who
has severed all relations with the military may not constitutionally be
18 354 U.S. at 35, quoting from WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 1, at 107.
26 354 U.S. at 41, 65 (concurring opinions).
"' 158 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C. 1958).
1810 U.S.C. § 881 (Supp. V, 1958).
'p10 U.S.C. § 921 (Supp. V, 1958).
2 The court cited: Hines v. Mikell, 259 Fed. 28 (4th Cir. 1919) ; McCune v.
Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943) ; Ex parte Jochen, 257 Fed. 200 (S.D.
Tex. 1919) ; Ex parte Falls, 251 Fed. 415 (D.N.J. 1918). It should be noted that
these cases held only that the military could try civilians employed by the services
it the field during time of war.
21 Grisham v. Taylor, 161 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
22 10 U.S.C. § 918 (Supp. V, 1958).
22164 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Fla. 1958).
2 United States ex rel. Viscardi v. MacDonald, 265 Fed. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1920);
United States ex rel. Santantonio v. Warden, 265 Fed. 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1919).
The courts stated that inactive reservists were civilians subject to recall into active
service only "in time of war or national emergency." It is conceivable that the
same reasoning would apply today. See 10 U.S.C. § 672(a) (Supp. V, 1958).
" United States v. Gallagher, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 506, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957).
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tried by court-martial for offenses committed while he was in uniform.2 6
However, military jurisdiction is not lost when the serviceman im-
mediately re-enlists2 7 or retains an inactive reserve status.28  Civilian
dependents accompanying the armed forces abroad may not be subjected
to a military trial in peace time when charged with a capital crime.29
Whether this reasoning will be applied in civilian dependent non-capital
cases remains to be seen. However, a civilian employed by the armed
services abroad is deemed to have military status and consequently is
amenable to military jurisdiction,30 even in capital cases.3' It will be
interesting to see if the Supreme Court agrees that civilian employees
and inactive reservists are in the land and naval forces for purposes of
military trial in peace time.
RiCHA1RD VON BIBERSTEIN, JR.
Constitutional Law-Police Power-Changed Economic Condition of
Railroads Judicially Applied in Determining Reasonableness of
Ordinance
The generally accepted test as to the constitutionality of an exercise
of the police power' is whether under all the existing conditions and
surrounding circumstances it is reasonable ;2 i.e., it must be reasonably
adapted to accomplish a legitimate end,3 be reasonable toward persons
whom it affects, 4 must not be for the annoyance of a particular class,5
nor be unduly oppressive.6  Reasonableness is a question of law for the
=' United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
= United States v. Gallagher, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 506, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957).
u8 Wheeler v. Reynolds, 164 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Fla. 1958).
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 158 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C.
1958) ; it re Varney's Petition, 141 F. Supp. 190 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
" Grisham v. Taylor, 161 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
"Police power, although elusive of definition, has been defined as "the power
inherent in every sovereignty to govern men and things, under which power the
legislature may, within constitutional limits, not only prohibit all things hurtful
to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society, but may prescribe regulations to
promote the public health, morals, and safety, and add to the general public
convenience, prosperity, and welfare." 11 Am. JuR., Constitutional Law § 247
(1937).
' Austin v. Shaw, 235 N.C. 722, 71 S.E.2d 25 (1952); Berger v. Smith, 156
N.C. 323, 72 S.E. 376 (1911). It has been suggested, however, that an exercise
of the police power may be reasonable and yet unconstitutional. Soref, The
Doctrine of Reasonableness in the Pblice Power, 15 MA Q. L. Rzv. 3 (1930).
"It is necessary . . . that the proposed restriction have a reasonable and
substantial relation to the evil it purports to remedy." State v. Harris, 216 N.C.
746, 759, 6 S.E.2d 854, 863 (1940). See also East Side Levee and Sanitary Dist. v.
East St. Louis & C. Ry., 279 Ill. 123, 116 N.E. 720 (1917) ; Victory Cab Co. v.
Shaw, 232 N.C. 138, 59 S.E.2d 573 (1950).
'East Side Levee & Sanitary Dist. v. East St. Louis & C. Ry., supra note 3;
State v. Bass, 171 N.C. 780, 87 S.E. 972 (1916).
'Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) ; Town of Clinton v. Standard Oil Co.,
193 N.C. 432, 137 S.E. 183 (1927).
' Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note 5.
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